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Introduction
Many historians write that American meteorology finally emerged as a
world leader in scientific development in the 1950s with the establishment of
Operational Numerical Weather Prediction. Before this time, historians put
forward the notion of an obdurate weather bureau with no interest in
modernization or improvement. According to some, the U.S. Weather Bureau
focused only on short term practical forecasting rather than the theoretical
understanding of atmospheric circulation and composition.1 These
representations magnify the delayed incorporation of emerging techniques
such as air-mass analysis, while they deny, or at least minimize, the
meteorological improvements and dedication to advanced methods that are
apparent in the history of the national weather service and the employees
who consistently struggled with bureaucratic infighting and a lack of funding.
Historians such as Edwards,2 Harper,3 Turner,4 and Nebeker5 focused
their attention on the 1950s in order to perpetuate the idea that the Cold War
transformed meteorological practices in the United States, which it did.
However, this post-World War II focus resulted in sensational claims of rapid
development and modernization such as one from Edwards who wrote that
numerical weather prediction, “revolutionized weather forecasting,
1
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transforming an intuitive art into the first computational science.”6 Although
it is true that computational forecasting transformed the practices of the
bureau, Edward’s statement ignores the scientific techniques of the past.
Such other historians as Weber,7 Whitnah,8 and Popkin9 dedicated their study
to the bureaucracy within the bureau, largely ignoring the historical context
of the time. This failing is made clear through Whitnah’s statement that the
incorporation of air-mass analysis “proved to be a painfully slow process”10 as
he ignored the practical reasons for the delay such as urgent daily reporting
requirements, a lack of funding, new technological developments and
burdens, and some unfortunate scandals. Despite the fact that the agency has
not continuously been at the forefront of meteorological sciences since its
inception, to cast the bureau and its precursors in an archaic, stagnant light
ignores the rich meteorological history within the United States, conflates
meteorological science with weather services, and obscures the progression of
meteorological advancement.
Willis Ray Gregg echoed this devotion to improvement and the links
between innovation and quotidian practices in an article written in 1933. At
the time, Gregg headed the Aerological Section and a year later received a
promotion to chief of the bureau. He wrote of the agency’s acceptance of new
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methods and techniques, however that it erred on the side of caution before
adopting change due to their obligation to keep up daily operations:
There is reason to believe that the basic and essential features are
sound and will probably endure, but there are bound to be changes in
details as new ideas and methods are proposed. We should, and
undoubtedly shall, in the future as in the past, adopt such changes as
are shown to be superior to present methods.11

Such statements as these are ignored by historians such as Harper, who
instead write that the bureau discarded data and treated the work of the
service as more of an art than a science.12 I am arguing against the common
historiographical trend and instead offer one that identifies the difficulties,
obligations, and burdens of the bureau that influenced the development of the
scientific service agency within the United States until its incorporation into
ESSA (the Environmental Science Services Administration) in 1965.
Meteorological services are vulnerable to criticism from a number of
different perspectives. Every individual citizen is affected by the weather, so
any missed forecast can result in the condemnation of the forecasters
involved, if not the entire bureau. Despite this skepticism of weather services,
many national meteorological agencies emerged in the 19th century, including
the United States. Throughout its history, American meteorology has had
times of lethargy and times of cutting-edge development. The agencies, when
viewed in their entirety however, show a dedication to development that is
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largely ignored in current publications. The focus by many historians on the
early Cold War transformation of meteorology or the bureaucratic struggles
either ignores or distorts the longer scientific record of the agency. When the
history of the national weather service is viewed from the perspective of the
scientists of the time, a much more positive picture emerges, which indicates
that from the early 19th century, American meteorologists have diligently
worked to maintain a cutting edge in scientific practices.

19th Century Meteorology
Throughout the 19th century, a number of private and federal agencies
recorded meteorological information. The U.S. Army began weather
observations in 1812, with private sector work beginning in New York
academies in 1825. In the 1830s the Joint Committee (between the American
Philosophical Society and the Franklin Institute) in Philadelphia provides an
example of early theoretical work, which continued in the Smithsonian
meteorological project from 1849-1874. The Smithsonian project grew into a
network of meteorological stations that collected standardized observations
of temperature, barometric pressure, humidity, wind/cloud conditions, and
precipitation as far away as Mexico and Canada.13 The Civil War interrupted
the practice however, and the Smithsonian meteorological project never
recovered its antebellum status.

13
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Practical value in crop production and commerce security provided the
impetus for sponsored scientific study into the atmosphere and the emergence
of weather prediction around the globe. Even Vilhelm Bjerknes, dubbed the
father of modern meteorology due to his application of physics to the
atmosphere, began his forecasting in Bergen to aid the Norwegian crop
production and fishing industry during World War One. Forecasting primarily
aimed at avoiding loss of property and life, while maximizing agricultural
output, in other words, applied meteorology. Some individuals utilized the
data collected for climatic and theoretical study, yet the central focus
remained the impact of weather on agriculture. As the nation expanded
westward in the 19th and early 20th centuries, with lands previously
considered deserts opening to pioneers and agriculture, the bureau’s already
extensive list of duties grew to include a much larger and less populated area.
The need to provide forecasting and crop information to the west strained the
limited funding of the agency, which resulted in a prioritization of bureau
sections based on utility for the American citizen.
American meteorology has a substantial history of data compilation
because intellectuals studied the climate in an attempt to bring rational
understanding to the new world. Statesmen-naturalists such as George
Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson all kept weather
journals and advocated weather data collection in order to understand
climate and weather patterns for the benefit of the American citizenry.14

14
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American meteorological data expanded through army observations and the
emergence of scientists who devoted themselves to the study of meteorology.
Joseph Henry (1798-1878), the first Secretary of the Smithsonian
Institution, head of the Smithsonian’s meteorological project, and reluctantly
President of the National Academy of Sciences, fostered international
collaboration through data exchange, a process that is critical to
meteorological advancement. James Pollard Espy (1785-1860) provides an
example of another pioneer of early American meteorology. Dubbed the
“Storm King” for his work in storm formation and precipitation, Espy
theorized and experimented on the subject of what we might now call
saturated adiabatic expansion. Elias Loomis (1811-1889) created the first
synoptic weather map in 1846 and meticulously researched cyclones and
anticyclones through collected data. William Redfield (1789-1857) tracked
storm damage from Connecticut to Massachusetts before concluding that
storm winds blow counterclockwise around a center that follows the path of
prevailing winds. Redfield and Espy had a number of lively debates on this
hypothesis, as Espy theorized that vertical convection and condensation were
the essential components of storms; further developments revealed that both
premises are necessary for a complete storm theory. While this list of early
American meteorologists is by no means complete, these individuals serve the
purpose of illustrating the constant and significant work on meteorological
issues before the establishment of a state sponsored agency.15
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During the 19th century, especially in the latter half of the century,
American contributions to the science of meteorology have to be considered
as advanced if not more so when compared with its counterparts in Europe.
William J. Humphreys, a senior meteorological physicist for the bureau and
editor of the Monthly Weather Review from 1931-1935, wrote about Espy in a
1942 paper: “From 1835 to the end of his life he devoted practically his entire
time to the study of meteorological problems, to which subject he became one
of America’s greatest contributors.”16 Loomis also falls into the category of
one of America’s most influential meteorological contributors through his
rigorous work with collected data. In 1840 he advocated the idea of
overlapping warm and cold air masses, however he did not use this
terminology.17 Humphreys accredited Loomis with scientific understanding
well ahead of his time, “He reaches important conclusions previously not
generally accepted or, in some cases, not even suspected, that are entirely
sound.”18 Humphreys continues the praise later in his article stating that
anyone who read Loomis’ paper would believe:
That he was reading a sound theoretical discussion by one of our most
advanced air mass analysts. This paper is a very important
contribution to air mass analysis made more than one hundred years
ago by one of our greatest contributors to the science of meteorology.19
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In the same paper Humphreys wrote about the importance and
subsequent neglect of 19th century meteorological work, a mistake that has
continued into the present day.20 Although this discussion of 19th century
American meteorological advancements pre-dates the weather bureau, it is
crucial for the development of the national weather service. American
meteorology held great value to the development of the scientific field in the
19th century and set the stage for the government sponsored service to
emerge.

The Signal Service
The establishment of the national weather service through the military
came about due to the tireless effort and insistence from Increase Lapham
and Cleveland Abbe. Head of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, Colonel Albert J.
Myer, also advocated for the service to be added to his department’s
responsibilities. Myer witnessed a drastic decrease in funding after
Appomattox, and as a result, welcomed the new obligations for his agency.
These three men convinced Congress of the benefit that a weather service
could afford the nation and provided the agency to house it.21
While Abbe highly influenced American meteorology generally,
Lapham’s influence on the national weather service is limited to the inception
of the agency. Still, Lapham published over forty papers and circulated Espy’s
storm theory around the Midwest in order to gain support for a storm
20
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warning system through scientific practice.22 Lapham witnessed devastating
effects of storms on the Great Lakes and the toll on the nation’s commercial
interests. Eric Miller wrote about Lapham’s concern, “Shipwrecks on the
Great Lakes were a matter of grave concern to Lapham, hence when the
reports of Espy, formulating the laws of storms were published, Lapham
began agitating for their practical application.”23 Lapham and Abbe were able
to gain the support of Wisconsin Congressman General Halbert E. Paine who
studied under Elias Loomis at Western Reserve College and saw the benefit of
a storm warning system in his immediate region. The process of establishing
the service consisted of prolonged effort and continuous insistence by Abbe,
Lapham, and Congressman Paine. Lapham, who focused upon the practical
utility of the service, wrote multiple letters to Paine who read them to
Congress, including one in 1869 that reads:
I take the liberty of calling your attention to the accompanying list of
disasters to the commerce of our Great Lakes during the past year, and
to ask whether its appalling magnitude does not make it the duty of the
Government to see whether anything can be done to prevent, at least,
some portion of this sad loss in the future.24

Lapham was not the only one to write Paine and Congress, as Colonel Myer
insisted upon the service being assigned to his department. As Paine recalled
years later, “a stranger called upon me and introduced himself as Colonel
Myer, of the Signal Corps. He exhibited the most intense anxiety for the
22
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success of the measure. It seemed to me that his zeal and enthusiasm marked
him as the fit man to launch the new enterprise.”25 Congress hesitated to
endorse the service due to concerns over fiscal responsibility and overall
efficacy of the proposed benefits. After significant loss of life and goods on the
Great Lakes and repeated insistence from Abbe, Lapham, and Myer, the
weather division of the U.S. Army Signal Service was established in 1870 with
Myer as Chief.26
Both Abbe and Lapham questioned the military’s involvement in the
scientific endeavor; however, as Roy Popkin wrote, Myer “pointed out that
military discipline might help achieve uniformity of reporting and that
utilization of military personnel would save considerable money.”27 This
interaction between the military and the national weather service is found
consistently throughout American history. Meteorology provides information
for each armed conflict, while military technology is utilized for updating and
improving meteorological data collection and research. Despite their
reluctance to enact the service, Congress quickly recognized the contributions
of the Signal Service as valuable to American commerce and agriculture as is
reflected through a dramatic 800% funding increase between 1869 and 1874.28
This budgetary growth needs to be justified by the fact that the amount

25
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consistently displeased Myer. Miller wrote that the funds were “quickly
swallowed by rapidly increasing demands for service to the public.”29
The Signal Service effectively utilized telegraphy to transmit
information across the continental U.S. for the benefit of the American
citizen. The reports focused on agricultural effects as well as storm warnings,
as James Fleming writes, “Signal service observers reported on the hatching
and migration of locust swarms, on frost and drought in the cotton, corn and
tobacco-growing regions, on hazards to shipping along the coast. Mercantile
interests were advised of weather conditions affecting the packing and
shipment of perishable goods such as oysters, pork and ice.”30 The service not
only engaged in practical storm warning and predictions, but it also included
a theoretical branch. Patrick Hughes wrote about this research section’s place
within the bureau, “Although its emphasis was always on the practical
application of the weather service, the Signal Service did foster a modest
meteorological research program.”31 At Cleveland Abbe’s insistence the
Service established a “study room” at the main office for research purposes
and in 1881 established a school for specialized training in meteorology at
Fort Myer, Virginia. William A. Koelsch wrote about this in-service training
and how it perpetuated through time,
The Signal Corps school was America’s first postgraduate program in
meteorology, and the military continued to use this in-service model
through the 1919-1945 period. Out of the Signal Service venture also
29
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came cooperative research and study arrangements with physical
scientists at several universities.32

Although the school shut down due to fiscal concerns, the weather bureau
chiefs insisted that meteorologists under their employ give lectures to
universities and high schools in order to foster a youthful interest in
atmospheric studies. As Frank Hartwell (a senior meteorologist within the
bureau) remembered, “The greatest encouragement was given to officials in
charge to speak before schools and academies.”33
After General Myer passed away in 1880 the Service underwent a
decade of turmoil and strife. General William Hazen replaced Myer and
quickly added four senior and three junior professors to increase the scientific
standing of the agency. Unfortunately for Hazen, the agency was forced to
reduce its budget significantly after it surfaced in 1881 that Captain Henry W.
Howgate embezzled up to $237,000.34 Howgate, a disbursing officer, made use
of fraudulent vouchers for his crime that caused the entire agency to come
under suspicion of fraud. This scandal was the first, but by no means the last
to tarnish the reputation and foster a distrust of the weather service. Hazen’s
administration also came under criticism in regards to its autonomy within
the army. The War Department believed that the Signal Service’s weather
obligations would render them useless for combat in an armed conflict. The
growing distrust resulted in the congressional appointment of the Allison
32
33
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Commission in 1884, which reviewed the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the
Hydrographic Office of the Navy Department, the Geological Survey, and the
Signal Service in order to assess the work of government sponsored science.
Each of the agencies under review experienced conflict within the
government due to jurisdiction, scandal, or purpose and the Commission was
tasked with finding a solution. As David Guston wrote, “Given the
uncomfortable jurisdictional problems and the scientific character of each of
the disputed agencies, prominent voices from the scientific community called
for at least the consolidation of the surveys or even for the creation of a new
Department of Science.”35 The scientists of the agencies under question
viewed the Allison Commission as congressional meddling, an inappropriate
judgment by laymen. The Commission focused on the practical value of the
agencies, putting little to no value on theoretical research. The Commission
decided to close the school at Fort Myer and recommended a slow transition
of the bureau out of the military in order to avoid a disruption of function due
to turnover.36
When General Hazen died in 1887, General A. W. Greely stepped in as
his successor. Greely’s administration faced many of the same problems as
Hazen and as a result, Congress moved the weather service out of the military
and into the Department of Agriculture. In 1890 the weather responsibilities
of the Signal Service transferred to the newly established U.S. Weather
Bureau with Professor Mark Harrington from the University of Michigan as
35
36
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chief. Harrington welcomed the appointment and the continued employment
of Cleveland Abbe who fostered a dedication to research and improved
methods within the bureau.

Cleveland Abbe
The national weather service developed in the United States largely
due to the contributions of Cleveland Abbe (1838-1916). America’s first
weather forecaster, born in New York City, pursued an academic career as an
astronomer. In 1867 he switched academic departments and entered the field
of meteorology in order to overcome humanity’s ignorance of destructive
winds and rains and other weather phenomena. In 1869 he established the
first system of daily weather reports and maps in Cincinnati with the support
and assistance of the Chamber of Commerce and the Western Union
Telegraph Company. Lapham utilized the established infrastructure and
obvious utility of Abbe’s forecasts as examples of how the service could run
under government control. Abbe’s experience and success prompted Colonel
Myer to offer him the position of civilian assistant in the office of the Chief
Signal Officer where he could prepare his daily reports for circulation.
Abbe joined the U.S. government’s weather service as its first chief
meteorologist in 1871 with two goals in mind: the optimization of the
weather service and the study of theoretical meteorology.37 His background in
astronomy and interest in the outer reaches of the atmosphere led Abbe to

37
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utilize kite soundings in order to access data from the free-air at increasing
altitudes (kites affixed with a meteograph recorded information on
temperature and barometric pressure). He worked alongside Professor Charles
Marvin, who went on to become chief of the bureau, but during Abbe’s time
held the title “professor of meteorology;” Marvin and Abbe collaborated in
order to devise instrumentation for precise data collection, which afforded
them domestic and international recognition.
Abbe studied in Russia during his youth, exposing him to European
languages and academics. This experience made him a conduit for European
scientific ideas to be expressed in American practice. He advocated for
scientific forecasting based on equations of thermodynamics and fluid
dynamics; he even developed equations of atmospheric motion in 1901 that
are similar to those of Vilhelm Bjerknes’ of 1904. According to Willis and
Hooke, “Both cataloged the necessary equations of state, continuity,
thermodynamics, and motion. Both recognized the need for upperatmospheric observations.”38
While the kite soundings did not provide the upper-air information of
later technologies such as radiosondes and airplanes, Abbe and Marvin were
able to collect accurate data from higher altitudes than was common practice
at the time by flying the kites in tandem using piano wires. This innovation
and development of instrumentation highlights the fact that American
meteorology operated at the cutting edge of the science at the inception of the

38
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bureau. While the agency may not have had the budget for extensive
theoretical study, it is clear that individuals such as Cleveland Abbe were still
able to explore research problems, simply on a reduced scale. Abbe insisted on
establishing data collection stations on mountaintops, in order to monitor
atmospheric data from the highest altitude possible. While this information
proved useful for specific studies, Chief Willis Ray Gregg wrote in 1933 about
why the data collected at mountaintop stations proved difficult to utilize in
air-mass analysis:
It was soon recognized, however… that they were not truly
representative of conditions in the free air. They were too much
influenced by the mountain itself and by the neighboring terrain. In
short, they represented neither true surface nor true free-air
conditions.39

These problems highlight the necessity of developing accurate tools to
measure the free air removed from obstructions. As air masses are forced into
the upper atmosphere by mountaintops the air condenses and cools. This
problem was not limited to mountaintops though, as the neighboring terrain
also often affected data collected from rooftops. While Abbe did not know of
this problem, he recognized the importance of collecting the information in
order to further study atmospheric circulation.
Although some of the early members of the weather service were
civilians or enlisted men without meteorological training, Abbe stressed the
importance of high scientific standards and “required the weather service to
39
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stay at the forefront of technology.”40 Each Signal Officer was required to pass
an exam of scientific merit that would undoubtedly stump many graduate
students today. Abbe was a contemporary and a colleague of Vilhelm
Bjerknes. Independently, they developed similar work and maintained a
cordial and beneficial relationship. As Robert Marc Friedman wrote in
Appropriating the Weather, “Bjerknes began a correspondence with Abbe that
proved valuable during the next several years.”41 In 1905 Abbe helped
Bjerknes secure funding from the Carnegie Institution for a full-time assistant
and provided him with upper-air data from cyclones and anticyclones in the
United States as collected from kites.
Abbe prepared three weather probabilities a day for the Signal Service,
earning him the nickname “Old Probabilities,” a moniker bestowed upon him
by Mark Twain.42 He also founded the Monthly Weather Review; from
humble beginnings in 1873 the journal transformed into one of the leading
meteorological journals of the world in only twenty years under Abbe’s
editorship. The foundation of the national weather service and its devotion to
cutting edge meteorological practices of the time highlights the problem with
the commonly held opinion that the weather bureau was archaic and antireform. Abbe worked in collaboration with the bureau until his death in 1916,
the beginning of a forgettable time in American meteorology according to
many historians; however, I disagree. Although the loss of Abbe diminished
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the scientific practices of the agency, the subsequent two decades resulted in
great advancement in meteorological practices around the world, the United
States included.
Cleveland Abbe serves as a contradiction to common historical
representations of the bureau as he constantly refined the scientific practice
of meteorology in the United States. His accomplishments and recognition
abroad highlights the necessity for historians to include greater detail on his
career in their histories of the weather service, as his work and influence are
clear examples of excellence within the field.

The United States Weather Bureau
In 1890 Secretary of Agriculture Jeremiah Rusk invited Mark
Harrington, a professor of astronomy and meteorology at the University of
Michigan to be the first civilian chief of the weather bureau. While the agency
under his guidance is not known for its development of theoretical research,
Harrington emphasized climate studies before developing an interest in
Abbe’s work in numerical forecasting.43 Unfortunately, the economic
depression of 1893 brought government agents of fiscal responsibility into
office who viewed the bureau as a wasteful department. Tensions between
the chief and his superiors over practices and funding plagued the bureau for
much of the first three decades of its civilian existence.

43
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The fact that the agency transferred to the Department of Agriculture
highlights its focus on practical tasks. Westward expansion opened up
immense tracks of land for crops and farmers were in constant need of
weather forecasts. Accompanying the transfer of weather services from the
military into the civilian government was the definitive establishment of the
bureau’s duties. Section three of the act reads:
That the Chief of the Weather Bureau, under the direction of the
Secretary of Agriculture, on and after July 1, 1891, shall have charge of
the forecasting of weather, the issue of storm warnings, the display of
weather and flood signals for the benefit of agriculture, commerce, and
navigation, the gauging and reporting of rivers, the maintenance and
operation of seacoast telegraph lines and the collection and
transmission of marine intelligence for the benefit of commerce and
navigation, the reporting of temperature and rainfall conditions for the
cotton interests, the display of frost and cold-wave signals, the
distribution of meteorological information in the interests of
agriculture and commerce, and the taking of such meteorological
observations as may be necessary to establish and record the climatic
conditions of the United States, or as are essential for the proper
execution of the foregoing duties.44
As the nation’s infrastructure developed in the early 20th century, the weather
bureau assumed responsibility for highway weather forecasting, aerological
studies to support aviation, and a fire-weather service in association with the
forestry department. With such an extensive list of obligations, the agency
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struggled to keep up with its duties and required the assistance of cooperative
observers (volunteers) from across the country.
Many of the individuals who worked for the bureau were not
meteorologists, but citizens trained for a specific duty. Fleming writes that
these employees had specific tasks, their “duties included reading the
instruments, launching balloons and wiring data to Washington.”45 Although
these observers were not ideal in terms of their qualifications, it was
imperative that information be collected from all around the country and
transmitted to the meteorologists at the bureau’s headquarters. Without the
assistance of volunteers, the bureau could not have collected nearly enough
information in order to compile climate data for the country.
While Chief Harrington aimed to improve the scientific practices of the
bureau, his tenure (1891-1895) was marred by controversy within the
hierarchy of the Department of Agriculture. Research under Harrington was
not ignored as has been purported in the past, but rather focused on the
practical utility and benefit of meteorology to the American citizenry. As
Popkin wrote:
In the research area, climatology and the relationship between weather
and crops was given major emphasis… In addition, a systematic
aerology research program was planned, focusing on the use of
balloons for high-altitude studies and observations.46

45
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Unfortunately, Harrington’s quarrels with Julius Morton, Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture in the late 1890s, resulted in Harrington’s ultimate
dismissal. Morton also had issues with other members of the weather bureau
including Cleveland Abbe. Willis and Hooke wrote about Morton’s
disapproval with the weather service: “Morton had taken office with the
Cleveland administration just before the Panic of 1893 and the ensuing
depression. Budget cutting extended across all agencies. He let it be known
that over 20 years Abbe had received $90,000 in compensation ‘for which the
government had received back no adequate return.’”47 Morton used his
authority to demote and reduce Abbe’s salary, illustrating the strained
relationship between the agency and the policy makers in Washington, who
consistently attempted to cut the agency’s funding. As Popkin wrote about the
struggle, “Morton feuded with Cleveland Abbe in an effort to reduce research
funds. Abbe resisted eloquently, and his salary was reduced only over Chief
Harrington’s objections; there was constant friction between Morton and
Harrington over budget cuts.”48
Professor Willis Moore replaced Harrington as chief in 1895, but
encountered similar problems as his predecessor. A native Pennsylvanian who
worked his way up the ranks of the bureau, Moore proved to be a capable
chief until he undermined his tenure through his own political aspirations
and personal confrontations. The agency’s reputation suffered further
disgrace due to a missed forecast of the Galveston Hurricane in 1900 in which
47
48
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8000 individuals perished in the deadliest hurricane in American history.49
Despite these issues, there were individuals who sympathized with Moore
such as Frank Hartwell who wrote that he was a victim of, “A hostile
campaign launched against him by politicians without and petty enemies
within the Bureau, men with fancied grudges who aided and abetted the
politicians.”50 The first scandal of Moore’s career resulted from a careless
mistake, which accentuated the perception of the bureau as mismanaged and
set the tone for the rest of his tenure. Moore did not adequately inform
Congress of the application of the bureau’s appropriations, specifically with
respect to Mount Weather in Virginia. Moore failed to outline the planned
construction and was accused of building his own vacation home to escape
the Washington summers, neglecting the needs of the nation.51
Mount Weather, in the Appalachian Mountains some 60 miles west of
Washington, was established in the 1890s, before Moore’s time as chief.
Construction continued on Mount Weather each year, adding facilities as they
were needed. Accompanying this accusation was the fact that Moore held
high standards for the members of the bureau, and some came to resent it,
resulting in further complications from bureau employees. Popkin wrote
about the time,
The controversy resulted in an era of hypercritical examination of the
Bureau’s fiscal practices. At the same time, employees of the Bureau
49
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were becoming increasingly bitter about Moore’s harsh enforcement of
discipline. Their complaints led to additional investigations and more
relationship problems.52

These allegations were exacerbated by a missed forecast for President Taft’s
inauguration and a bitter, retired division chief, James Berry, who provided
congress with a great deal of derogatory information about Moore and the
bureau. The New York Times reported in 1913 that Berry provided
Representative Robert Fowler of Illinois with documents that called weather
bureau affairs into question. The article describes Berry’s personal
relationship with Moore as strained, “[Berry] has been after Prof. Moore’s
scalp for years.”53 Moore’s career as chief of the bureau came to an end largely
due to these documents and the accusation that he utilized bureau funds and
employees to promote his campaign for Secretary of Agriculture. Moore
disputed these claims in the media to no avail, “I brand as infamously false
the intimation that any man in the Weather Bureau has been coerced into
supporting me for the Secretaryship, any man promoted for serving me, or a
dollar of public money expended in my candidacy. I worked for the place and
spent my own money, and so did many of my friends.”54 Moore’s bid for the
secretary position not only ended his government work, but it also further
tarnished the perception of the bureau.
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With all of the negative attention received by the bureau throughout
the tenure of the first two civilian chiefs the negative light in which the
bureau has been cast and the difficulties in procuring funds becomes clear.
The scandal that ended Moore’s career in 1913 resulted in further sanctions
toward the bureau that persisted into the tenures of subsequent chiefs.
Popkin wrote about its effect, “Many other Weather Bureau employees were
dismissed or otherwise punished, but the worst effect of the scandal was that
for several years afterward, the weather bureau had difficulty obtaining
increased appropriations and most research activity was dropped or severely
limited.”55
Donald Whitnah, who wrote a history of the agency in 1961, credits
Moore with advancing the bureau despite the scandals and difficulties of
securing funding, including a sixty-one data collection station expansion,
“Moore was energetic and continually operating on the premise that all public
services and research must be broadened; he expanded operations noticeably
while head of the Bureau.”56 During the subsequent leadership of chief’s
Charles Marvin (1913-1934), Willis Ray Gregg (1934-1938), and Francis
Reichelderfer (1938-1963) the U.S. Weather Bureau left a majority of the
controversy that plagued the first few decades behind. Inheriting a
controversial agency with influential enemies limited the effectiveness of
these chiefs, however they were still able to improve the bureau markedly.
According to Popkin:
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Marvin and Gregg were frequently called conservative, but internal
employee relationships and working conditions improved markedly
under their administrations. Both of these chiefs moved as best they
could to bring about improvements within existing techniques and
methodology.57

Marvin set the stage for the bureau’s rapid modernization through his
influential technical work on meteorological instruments. Hartwell
remembered Marvin’s important contributions to the field, “He spent much
time in the field, was head of the instrument division for a number of years,
where he improved and devised self-recording apparatuses and instruments
which received recognition from meteorological services at home and
abroad.”58 World War I provided Marvin the opportunity to institute upperair sounding balloons and to develop marine and aviation weather services.
This daily data collection supported reconnaissance, mail flights, troop
movement, camp health, use of poison gas (hourly collection), and long-range
artillery shelling throughout America’s brief, but intense military
campaign.59,60
These soundings continued after the war due to the growing aviation
industry as well as the knowledge that upper air influences surface weather.
The growing necessity of attaining upper-air data to benefit aerology required
intensive labor and research. Coupled with the benefit for aviation, upper-air
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information proved vital to the emerging meteorological practice of air-mass
analysis and the polar front theory. Vilhelm Bjerknes founded the Bergen
School in Norway in 1917 and worked with his son and other scientists to
develop these theories into effective methods of forecasting and atmospheric
understanding.

The Bergen School, Vilhelm Bjerknes and Associates
Vilhelm Bjerknes set up the Bergen School of Meteorology in Norway
and began extensive study into the atmosphere and climate. In the late 1920s
and early 1930s the Bergen school techniques of air-mass analysis and the
polar front garnered increased attention from the international
meteorological community, the United States included. Their incorporation
into meteorological practices around the globe however, required time for
further study. Tor Bergeron, one of the Bergen school pioneers, wrote about a
great many failures during 1918-1925 in both theoretical and practical work
in Norway due to “the purely practical circumstance that the meteorologist
could not distinguish the representative observations from the
irrepresentative ones.”61 Bergeron, one of the primary contributors to Bergen
theories, is credited with discovering the occlusion process, which is the final
stage of an extratropical cyclone.62
While it is true that the methods developed at the Bergen school
eventually revolutionized meteorological practices, it is important to keep in
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mind that these ideas developed slowly over time through the collaboration of
many individuals. The first detailed publication about the Bergen methods did
not arrive until 1924 in a paper titled “Waves and Vortices at a
Quasistationary Frontal Surface over Europe.”63 Only after Bergeron’s 1928
dissertation, “Three-Dimensionally Combining Synoptic Analysis,” were the
methods widely understood and largely accepted across the globe, however
incorporation necessitated further study. Chief Gregg compared upper-air
meteorological advancements between Europe and the United States in the
1920s in an article he wrote for the Monthly Weather Review. He admitted
that some countries progressed more rapidly, but that “there as here this
whole period was one of transition and experiment.”64
Vilhelm and Jakob Bjerknes traveled throughout Europe and the
United States, meeting with Gregg and other national weather service chiefs,
in order to promote their ideas. Universal acceptance that these methods
would benefit the practical work of the agencies did not emerge, as Friedman
wrote, “part of the problem was that they were trying to market an
incomplete product. Theoretical underpinnings for the new models had yet to
be worked out: heavy work loads left little time for writing and publishing.”65
Carl-Gustaf Rossby and Sverre Petterssen aided in the United States
Weather Bureau’s implementation of air-mass analysis, as they were
previously trained at Bergen. Rossby, who went on to teach at MIT and the
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University of Chicago, made major contributions to most meteorological
developments in the 20th century, as Turner wrote, “He also developed a
theory of atmospheric motion that enabled hemispheric scale changes to be
calculated, a discovery that made him one of the most celebrated atmospheric
physicists since Vilhelm Bjerknes.”66 The process of incorporating these new
methods necessitated the training and hiring of new meteorologists; Harry
Wexler, Jerome Namias, and Horace Byers are three who fulfilled this need.
Byers wrote in 1934 about the benefit of the air-mass work to the weather
forecaster in relation to the time spent preparing a prediction:
Recent advances in the graphical representation of air-mass properties
and new knowledge concerning the behavior of the upper air have been
helpful. In the course of nearly a year’s work in practical forecasting…
the writer has found a highly satisfactory degree of success possible
without the expenditure of a great deal of time.67

Byers’ optimism with the new methods was not uniformly shared around the
world. David Brunt, professor of meteorology at Imperial College, strongly
objected to the Norwegian emphasis on upper-air data in 1935, due to the lack
of practical application:
There has unquestionably been a considerable increase in the amount
of upper-air data available every day, but it is doubtful whether they
have proved as useful as was anticipated some 16 years ago. In
practical forecasting the use which can be made of upper-air data is
relatively small. At times an observation of temperature in the upper
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air may facilitate the forecasting of thunderstorms or of rainfall, but
there are many days when the practical use made of the upper-air data
is only slight.68

Skepticism, funding, and a focus on practical utility delayed the incorporation
of Bergen techniques into weather bureau practices. Byers, Wexler and
Namias, all of whom studied under Rossby, advocated for and incorporated
the Bergen methods in the 1930s. Despite their enthusiasm for the techniques,
a taxing and arduous transition lay ahead as they encountered numerous
difficulties in the implementation of the Norwegian methods to the North
American climate.

Air Mass Analysis in the United States
The expansive territories of North America necessitated the
establishment of multiple new observation stations and trained observers to
monitor them. Chief Gregg discussed in 1937 that the International
Meteorological Committee recommended fifty upper air-monitoring stations
for Europe and upwards of one hundred and twenty five for North America.69
Without the appropriate amount of data, the air-mass analysis section of the
weather bureau was doomed to inadequate and faulty forecasting. Even with
the necessary aerological stations the techniques were difficult to utilize, as
Tor Bergeron wrote in reflection in 1941, “In fact, part of the new methods

68
69

Brunt, “Some Problems of Modern Meteorology.”
Gregg, “Advances in International Meteorology in 1936 and 1937.”

31
seemed impossible to learn from books and could only be taught by prolonged
personal contact with the adepts of these methods.”70
The Gulf of Mexico, the Rocky Mountains, and the Gulf Stream all
distort air mass movement or tracking and highlight the importance of
further collection and study of upper-air data. Air-mass movement is
distorted by lee side lows after moving across the Rocky Mountains while the
temperature and humidity of air moving over the Gulf of Mexico and Gulf
Stream are not as clearly defined as they are over the North Sea or Siberia.
The Gulf Stream is affected by planetary waves (discovered and defined by
Rossby in the 1930s, named Rossby Waves), which can intensify the currents
as well as push them off their usual course. These currents transport
immense quantities of heat; a minor shift in their position can dramatically
affect weather in the United States and around the globe. In 1927, Rossby
wrote about the geographical differences between Scandinavia and the United
States as they pertained to air masses, “In Europe there is a large land area in
the south with a comparatively warm ocean to the north and west, while in
the Gulf region the distribution is just the opposite.”71 The paper that he coauthored with Richard Hanson Weightman discussed the differences in
greater detail, highlighting the necessity of establishing a greater number of
observation centers:
As regards the distribution of stations, it is obvious that over the West
they are entirely too scattered to make possible a reliable analysis of
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the fronts. The topography, which is extremely irregular, not only
affects but in many cases actually determines the movements of the
fronts, and a network of stations at least as dense as that over the East
is necessary for even a rather crude analysis.72

Although the need for upper air data collection had been known since Chief
Moore’s time in office, researchers encountered significant difficulties in
gathering it.73 Abbe and others engaged in kite measurements since the turn
of the century; however, they did not reach an appropriate altitude and as
Rossby made clear, there were hardly an adequate number of observation
stations around the United States. Accompanying the lack of stations were
obvious shortcomings within all the established upper-air data collection
methods in the first few decades of the 20th century. In the 1930s the bureau
had to develop ways of collecting accurate data from across the country
despite a revitalized skepticism and distrust of the agency.
In 1933 the USS Akron dirigible crashed due to severe weather off the
coast of New Jersey killing seventy-three, the greatest lighter-than-air
disaster in history at the time. Although blame rested with the pilot, the
bureau’s severe weather advisory was considered lacking. The Akron incident
provided the impetus for President Roosevelt to sign into existence the
Science Advisory Board, which acted as a review panel for government
scientific agencies, including the weather bureau. The New York Times
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reported the board as an extension of the New Deal with a goal to further
science in the United States, not curb it:
This collective and cooperative organizing does not call for any
regimenting of science into a goose-step discipline: indeed, it cannot if
science is to live; but it does require a national awareness of what is
being done in the laboratories, and a national plan to foster research all
along the front and to make prompt use of its discoveries and
inventions. The setting up of the Science Advisory Board is interpreted
as a first step in such a policy.74

The special committee on the weather bureau included Isaiah Bowman
(chairman of National Research Council and director of the American
Geographical Society), Karl T. Compton (chairman of the Science Advisory
Board, president of MIT), Charles D. Reed (a weather bureau forecaster), and
Robert A. Millikan (director of Norman Bridge Laboratory of Physics and
chairman of the executive council of CIT). They made a number of
suggestions, most notably to incorporate the Bergen methods as soon as
feasible. The board is often viewed as further insult to the bureau, that
bringing in experts from other scientific fields to evaluate the agency signifies
how poorly the bureau performed. The board’s main goal however, was to
prevent harmful and foolish changes in the structure and activities of
government science and they insisted on the bureau having access to more
funds in order to enact the necessary changes. As Chief Gregg wrote about the
report, “the special committee itself has, in its report, sounded a note of
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caution against too precipitate a change from the old well-established and
quite efficient methods of forecasting to the newer, so-called ‘Air Mass
Analysis’ method.”75 The board’s report also included positive conclusions
about the agency, specifically about the cooperation with volunteer data
collectors.76
Nevertheless, the bureau could only establish twenty upper-air data
collection stations through the collaboration of military and civilian agencies.
As Chief Gregg wrote in October of 1934, the concepts were understood and
appreciated, but funding held back their incorporation into everyday use. He
wrote, “At the outset it should be emphasized that there is nothing
particularly new in the ‘Air Mass Analysis’ concept of forecasting. It has been
quite fully understood for many years, but its effective application has not
been possible, because it requires a greater wealth of observational material
than has heretofore been available.”77 Although the funding limited the rapid
establishment of new stations, the bureau’s historical dedication to data
collection aided in the eventual transition by allowing for further study into
North American air-mass movement. As Jerome Namias wrote in reflection
about the time period in 1976:
The Norwegians had developed an air mass classification system that
was supposed to give an idea of the structure of the upper air. As it
turned out, in America we were fortunate to be able to capitalize on a
rapidly developing aerological network, first by kites, then by
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airplanes, and then radiosondes. We were routinely analyzing the real
structure of the atmosphere when some of the invited Norwegians to
the U.S. were still talking ‘indirect aerology.’78

By indirect aerology, Namias meant the qualitative indications of the stability
of an air mass, not the quantitative data that allows for a more accurate
understanding and prediction.
A skeptic may claim the lack of funding a result of a mismanaged and
poorly performing bureau. However, the crushing economic impact of the
Great Depression in the early 1930s reveals the true source of financial
difficulties. The bureau had not been adequately funded for theoretical
research and practical work before the depression, however as a government
agency with mixed reports as to its efficiency, the bureau received heavy
cutbacks in the years 1933, ’34, and ’35. Reorganization, budget reduction,
and the cutting of personnel all drastically minimized the agencies
effectiveness. Turner wrote that the bureau lost nearly 45% of its funding
between 1932 and 1933.79 Gregg wrote about this funding problem in an
article for Science in 1934,
It will not be possible, however, to do all that should be done along this
line until more funds are provided. It should not be forgotten that the
bureau’s appropriation has suffered a reduction of some $800,000
during the past two years, and that much of the service then given up
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should be restored. Adding new features now, therefore, while still
working on a greatly reduced budget is not a particularly easy task.80

Due to funding cuts, the bureau had to reevaluate its priorities. The agency
made use of the funds available for the practical utility of the country,
sacrificing research questions and forcing a delay in the incorporation of air
mass analysis.
A number of individuals in and around the weather bureau were
opposed to change. Future head of research Harry Wexler pointed out that
there were criticisms “made in the 1920s and early 30s by people who were
loath to accept the Norwegian methods, and who seized upon any discrepancy
between analyses made by different men to discredit the newer methods.”81
Gregg, Reichelderfer, and Wexler among others however, were devoted to
improved scientific methods and technologies throughout their time in the
agency. While the bureau attempted modernization, the American economy
and agriculture stalled, forcing a weather bureau focus on the Midwest. In
the 1930s the bureau dealt with growing outcry and concern over the Dust
Bowl (which would continue until 1936). The agency still existed in the
Department of Agriculture, hence the weather bureau needed to explain why
the Dust Bowl occurred and find a solution. Chief Marvin wrote in 1930 about
the growing problem and how little was known about its origins:
Directing our answer particularly to the extensive drought of 1930, all
we can say is that these unusual conditions are best explained as a
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prolonged stagnation of the air over nearly the whole continental
extent of the United States… but the experts are unable to assign a
specific cause for the prolonged stagnation.82

The bureau’s focus on the immediate problem of the dust bowl further
complicated the incorporation of air-mass analysis. Even though Marvin
discussed the cause as stagnant air, it was not believed that further research
in the upper-air would ameliorate the situation of the American farmer in a
timely manner.
Even after the Norwegian techniques were incorporated into the
bureau they did not replace the forecasting methods that were already in use.
This is not only because some established forecasters were resistant to
change, but also because surface data remained of vital importance to the
nation and the industries that relied on accurate information. As Whitnah
wrote, "In the final analysis, the new technique of analyzing the upper air did
not replace but rather supplemented the previous methods of forecasting
based on surface conditions. Surface data remained of much importance to
the meteorologist."83 Although the upper air influences weather forecasting
and surface weather phenomena, practical information about frost warnings
for agricultural purposes still relied heavily on surface data.
The Bergen School techniques entered into practice around the globe
after years of study and research. Weather services often required personal
instruction from an individual who trained in Norway for accurate
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implementation. As Tor Bergeron explained, “this method, this system of rules
and recommendations, is easy to understand theoretically – the rules being
based on clear physical principles and practical observations – experience has
shown that the rules are difficult to apply in practice.”84 As a result of the
necessary time for implementation, historians such as Frederik Nebeker have
made claims about the bureau’s resistance that have been accepted as fact:
“The stodginess of many national weather services delayed by a decade or so
their [Bergen techniques] general adoption.”85
In order to improve on forecasting accuracy the weather bureau
eventually adopted the Norwegian methods. As Gregg wrote in the 1934/35
report of the bureau, “Work in this line [air mass analysis] is progressing. A
reasonably successful system of forecasting must not be altered unless and
until it is doubly certain that the proposed alteration is really an
improvement.”86 Kristine Harper discussed in Weather By the Numbers how
Reichelderfer had circulated these ideas within the Navy Aerological Service
throughout the late 1920s making him the obvious choice to implement them
after Gregg’s sudden death in 1938. During this time of incorporation, the
bureau is accused of excessive obduracy. The weather bureau quickly
recovered from this brief delay in large part due to meteorology’s renewed
importance to the nation during and after the Second World War.
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William Jackson Humphreys
The meteorological physicist William J. Humphreys provides another
example of an individual within the U.S. Weather Bureau who improved the
practices and methods of the agency’s service. He worked in the bureau from
July 1, 1905 until December 31, 1935, thus encompassing a majority of the
time period portrayed as a scientific backwater. Humphreys has been
disregarded or overlooked in many historical representations of the bureau,
but he is a direct contradiction to the notion of a backward, poorly educated
pool of employees. While it is true that many of the individuals who gathered
supplemental climate data from around the country were volunteers who
trained on the job, Humphreys, much like Cleveland Abbe before him, made
use of the collected data for theoretical and practical purposes.
Humphreys was born into humble circumstances in a one-room log
cabin in West Virginia, but managed to study physics at Washington and Lee
University, the University of Virginia (where he also taught), and at Johns
Hopkins University where he received his Ph.D. in 1897. Humphreys entered
the weather bureau already established in physics through notable
contributions to the field of spectroscopy, involving the pressure shifts of
spectrum lines, which, according to his colleague Edward Woolard, “ranks
among the most fundamental contributions to physics ever made.”87 Not to be
overshadowed by his earlier work, however, Humphreys furthered
meteorological knowledge through his finding in 1909 of a physical
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explanation for the existence and the principal characteristics of the
stratosphere.88 Humphreys has a long list of published papers and books, most
notably his book, Physics of the Air, which remained a standard work into the
1950s.
Humphreys’ 1933 essay “On the Research Work of the U.S. Weather
Bureau,” discussed obstacles standing in the way of improved forecasting, as
well as the importance of further research projects.89 His essay also refuted
popular misconceptions of the inefficiency of the bureau. In his
characteristically subtle yet efficient manner, Humphreys reprimanded those
who, without experience of their own, criticize the practice of weather
forecasting. He pointed out the layman’s mistake through a closer
examination of the process of measuring rainfall:
Of course those without experience in such matters might think that
this would be the easiest sort of thing to do. For instance, one who has
not tried naturally is cocksure that an accurate measurement of the
amount of precipitation is the simplest thing in the world to effect, but
investigation soon revealed the disturbing fact that the amount of
water captured by any and every rain gage varied with the nature and
proximity of neighboring objects, height of the catching vessel above
ground, strength of the wind, and other factors.90

Even if a rain gauge is perfectly calibrated, Humphreys pointed out, it could
not successfully collect and measure snowfall, which requires additional
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investigation. Precise and representative rain and snowfall measurements
over an entire watershed help determine stream flow, which is important in
flood forecasts and climatology statistics as well as seasonal irrigation for
routine agricultural purposes. By linking measurements, instrumentation,
forecasting, and utility together, Humphreys clearly illustrated the difficulties
of making what is generally considered to be one of the most basic weather
observations.
Humphreys continued his article by discussing the problems with
apparatuses that measure humidity, evaporation, and wind data. Although
there were methods in 1933 that could record all three variables with some
level of accuracy, all required calculations and had innate shortcomings in
attaining actual, accurate data. The most acute problem was gathering data
from the upper atmosphere. It is important to remember that the weather
bureau provided an extensive list of services to the entire country, free of
charge, highlighting the obligations that required the time of employees.
Specific agricultural reports, flooding and river reports, upper air information
for the burgeoning aviation industry, as well as forecasting put an incredible
burden on the bureau that was exacerbated by public perception and
criticisms of their practices. There are numerous examples of articles and
letters from within the bureau and in journals (such as Humphreys’ article of
1933) that actively seek to make the agency’s responsibilities known and
appreciated.

42
Aviation and Upper Air Data Collection
Like all sciences, meteorological advancement is constrained by the
instruments and tools that allow accurate measurements. After World War I,
it became abundantly clear that weather phenomena arose from or were
directly caused by free air circulations far above the surface. Humphreys
acknowledged this understanding, writing that, ”the necessity was upon us
[the weather bureau] to devise some means of sounding the air miles deep for
its temperature, humidity, direction and velocity of movement, and any other
state or condition that indicates the nature of the coming weather.”91
Meteorologists devised different means of retrieving data, kite soundings
were effective, but could not reach the necessary altitude. In the early 20th
century, pilot balloons (colored black or white to maximize the contrast with
the sky and sometimes affixed with a light for nighttime launches) were
released into the atmosphere and tracked visually using a theodolite in order
to estimate the direction and velocity of the wind at various heights. Since an
observer on the ground made the measurements, the possibility for human
error remained quite large, especially when the winds were strong and the
balloon travelled away from the observer at an acute angle. Moreover, the
balloons disappeared from sight as soon as they rose into the clouds.
Sounding balloons, outfitted with a meteorograph to record
temperature, pressure, and humidity, provided important upper-air data, but
only after (and if) the instrument package safely parachuted back to earth,
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then recovered by a passerby, and returned to the weather bureau, a process
that could take months.92 Although aviation proved itself useful during World
War I, peacetime aviation still needed to find its place in the American
economy. As air travel was not considered safe, meteorological study of the
upper air proved critical to aviation. Once the postal service began to utilize
air travel the impetus for aerology revitalized the bureau’s interest in upper
air data. The United States aviation industry gained significant support for
research into practical use with the passage of the “landmark” Air Commerce
Act on May 20, 1926, which allowed for the subsequent fantastic growth of
the industry.93 This act added another duty to the weather bureau’s already
extensive list of obligations, but it also resulted in a substantial increase in
funding solely for the study of aerology to benefit the aviation industry;
“Appropriations for aerology totaled $175,000 in 1927 and surpassed $1.7
million for fiscal 1932.”94 The increase in funding allowed for the
establishment of new methods of gathering data from the upper atmosphere.
The bureau utilized balloons, kites, and airplanes all with varying levels of
success due to various unforeseen problems.
The danger and expense of airplane soundings removed its feasibility
for data collection in the 1920s. Funding played a major role in the delay of
incorporating airplane soundings as kites and balloons were less expensive
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and still delivered much of the same information.95 Airplane soundings began
on a regular basis alongside these two previous methods in 1931 because of
its ability to take measurements at a higher altitude, fly without the necessity
of wind (a kite shortcoming), and bring a human observer into the
atmosphere.96 It is important to note that this inclusion of airplane soundings
came before the Scientific Advisory Board’s report in 1933, highlighting the
fact that the bureau was devoted to improving its science and well aware of
the importance of upper-air data.
Of course, the airplane had its own shortcomings when it came to
collecting meteorological information. Airplanes are designed to fly
horizontally while the interaction of air masses and weather phenomena also
occur in the vertical dimension. Air masses tend to spread out horizontally, so
unless the pilot consistently changed his altitude, much of his data would be
uniform. Further difficulties were found in affixing a meteograph to an
airplane in order to be unaffected by the vibrations, exhaust, and heat of the
engine, a problem not satisfactorily solved until the mid 1930s.97 Moreover, as
Jeon wrote about the meteograph, “the instrument on a moving airplane was
unable to record the actual wind speed, which was one of the important
weather factors for aviators.”98 Although this problem can be solved by simple
arithmetic, the external variables (vibration, exhaust) rendered the actual
data difficult to decipher.
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In order to encourage pilots to ascend into the higher levels of the
atmosphere the weather bureau provided rewards. Jeon wrote about the
program to entice pilots into the risky venture, “There was a 10% bonus
policy for each additional 1500 feet (beyond 13,500 feet), which was an
‘incentive’ for reaching the greatest possible height.”99 Despite the incentives
and regular flights, the airplane was not entirely consistent in its collection of
meteorological data. For safety’s sake, they were unable to fly through severe
storm systems, which contain data critical to understanding its movement
and composition. While airplanes provided the most accurate and reliable
source of information, they were by no means the perfect vessel for acquiring
meteorological data and were dangerous to the pilot.
Twelve pilots died during weather missions; a common problem
resulted from the icing of the wings at elevated altitudes.100 Weather data
collection proved to be an intricate and dangerous process for all individuals
involved. Any minute mistake could ruin the purpose of the flight, Jeon wrote
about this danger,
[Airplane soundings] demanded ceaseless attention, because small
disturbances in various segments of each cycle – failure to reach high
altitude, instability of the instrument as a result of strong wind and
vibration, or even crash of a sounding airplane – could render any
inscription impossible or useless.101
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As a result, airplane soundings were disciplined with a regulated rate of
ascent and an immediate descent once attaining the desired altitude. In order
to deal with the instrumentation problems numerous theories as to the
proficient manner to affix the instruments emerged, including the suggestion
of a passenger holding the meteograph above his head for the duration of the
flight.
In 1937 the first radiosonde flew in Massachusetts, spelling a
transition from airplanes to balloons as the primary method of sounding the
atmosphere as these balloons could reach heights of 50,000 feet and
constantly transmit data back to the surface (since its inception in 1937, the
radiosonde has been improved to reach heights of 125 miles).102 By 1940 the
radiosonde completely replaced the airplane at weather bureau stations
because of their perceived benefits such as vertical travel, speed of data
collection, fewer required observers, safety, and extraordinary cost
effectiveness. Much like the airplane when it replaced previous balloons and
kites though, heavy reliance on radiosondes had problems of its own. Despite
calibration in pressure chambers before launch, there were individuals who
were skeptical of relying solely on the transmitted data.103 As a result a series
of tests and checks were studied through running simultaneous airplane and
meteograph soundings. Since the balloons follow different paths through the
air than airplanes, these studies resulted in further discrepancies. Although
not clearly evident whether the radiosonde produced a more accurate
102
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recording device than the airplane, the cost and temporal aspects of the
radiosonde resulted in its adoption as the primary sounding agent.104

Pushback, Misrepresentations, and Weather Control
It is vital to keep in mind just how little was known definitively about
the atmosphere in the 1930s. While theoretical work slowly developed into
practical use, the weather bureau’s chief task of predicting the coming
weather, but not necessarily understanding it forced a business as usual
attitude until new techniques were adequately proven.105 While the
meteorological community knew that upper air data held the key to
understanding the atmosphere, there was simply too much atmosphere to
measure. As Harry Wexler stated at the opening ceremony of the
International Geophysical Year on June 27, 1957, “Oceanographers like to put
us landlubbers in our proper places by pointing out that the oceans cover
three-fourths of the earth’s surface. In meteorology we have no need for such
defense mechanisms – everyone knows that the atmosphere covers all of the
earth’s surface.”106 Not only is it all around us, but miles deep and without
recognition of international borders. The necessity of attaining information
from around the globe, including over open water, further complicated the
bureau’s objectives. With all of the obstacles and difficulties in attaining
accurate and timely data from the upper atmosphere in the 1920s and 30s, it
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is no surprise that air-mass analysis did not take root in the weather bureau’s
practices until these matters were addressed. In addition to negative societal
perception, instrumentation, and funding problems, the bureau had to deal
with swindlers claiming weather control “powers” on a regular basis.
Throughout the first few decades of the 20th century, the weather
bureau came under consistent fire from academics, politicians, and laymen
alike. The New York Times regularly blasted the agency for failed forecasting,
such as one headline from 1921 which reads, “Failure of the United States
Weather Bureau to forecast conditions that brought about the frost was
responsible in large measure for the loss of more than $50,000 by farmers in
this section.”107 The weather affects every single individual in the country and
when any forecast proved incorrect, the agency was criticized. This fact is
evident through letters to the editor of the Times,
Can anybody tell me anything about the Weather Bureau? Has it gone
completely cock-eyed? Some of us amateur yachtsmen depend upon the
Weather Bureau, but we are getting discouraged with it. We are
beginning to believe it is bunk.108

While there is no denying that some of the missed forecasts were the fault of
the bureau, the developing meteorological practices that allowed for
forecasting were in the early stages of unraveling the unknown principles of
the Earth’s climate. Throughout its existence, the weather bureau
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consistently came under criticism due to their wide range of responsibilities,
the weather’s ever-present threat to turn severe, and the unjustified belief
that weather phenomena can be controlled.
It seems that humans have always been fascinated with the weather
and the potential for its management. Individuals have sought weather
control for personal economic gain, peaceful purposes, and militarization.
Weather bureau employees spent ample amount of time disproving control
claims, as Humphreys wrote about a conference he attended in Europe:
Only one man of the considerable number in attendance was cock sure
of the weather of the coming one, two, or several seasons in advance. I
knew him – pleasant enough personally – and understood that he made
his living by selling his season forecasts to gullible dealers in grain
futures. When pressed, as I was, for my forecast of the coming season, I
replied that I only could make a worthless guess, nor, I added, can
anyone else do better, whatever his claims.109

There have been ideas for avoiding hurricanes, warming the country, and
specifically for cloud seeding that have plagued the bureau and forced critical
funds and time to be spent on disproving these charlatan claims. As
Humphreys wrote in 1933, “All known schemes for inducing rainfall, or
preventing it, have been critically examined, and the cause or causes of the
failure of each fully explained.”110 Humphreys also wrote a book, Rain Making
and Other Weather Vagaries (1926), in which he attempted to inform the
public of the problems with weather control and its rich history. Fleming
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writes that Humphreys separated rainmaking into three categories: magical,
religious, and (supposedly) scientific.111
This however, did not discourage individuals such as Dr. George
Ambrosius Sykes from claiming rainmaking capabilities. In 1930 he
guaranteed horse-racing companies rain-free weeks that he simply could not
produce, “In two queer-looking huts, far from the grand stand, Dr. Sykes was
believed to have been working manfully with his secret paraphernalia. But
opinion as to his success in controlling the weather was divided… drops of
water came down.”112 Another weather charlatan, Charles Hatfield, distracted
the bureau as they were forced to disprove his claims as a “moisture
accelerator.” He operated throughout the early 1900s in the West as well as
Mexico and Canada, capitalizing on agriculturalists in desperate need of
precipitation.113
The bureau’s dedication to providing the American people with the free
service of accurate weather information and ridding the consumer of the
faulty claims to weather control are generally overlooked by historians of the
agency allowing them to claim a backwards bureau. The rainmaking claims
frustrated weather bureau officials, as Humphreys said, “By far the most
important feature of the rainmaker’s work consists in playing on the credulity
of mankind. Credulity disappointed is likely to be cruel.”114 In reality,
obligations, burdens, technical and logistic challenges, need for study, and an
111
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insufficient budget all resulted in difficulties that the bureau sought to
overcome in its quest for atmospheric understanding.

Military Involvement
The national weather service’s history is intimately linked with the
military. From data collection to prediction, military applications of
meteorological study resulted in times of rapid modernization for the science.
The founding of the weather service was located within a Civil War branch of
the War Department and military branches consistently utilized
meteorological information for preparation and planning. Both world wars
resulted in the necessity to train massive numbers of meteorological cadets in
order to provide information for aviation, troop movement, and artillery
shelling as well as coastal weather-patrol programs. The weather bureau
worked in collaboration with the military, affording the war effort with most
of its trained meteorologists as well as providing professors for the training
programs. Harry Wexler served as one of these professors, stationed in Grand
Rapids, Michigan. One of his exams highlights the specific training desired by
the military deemed critical for wartime meteorologists. The exam is titled,
“Meteorology For Chemical Warfare,” it establishes a scenario of poison
fallout and questions safe troop movement.115
Military support for modernization and improved techniques in
meteorological practices resulted in the steady rise in the American science.
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American scientists influenced World War II by providing intelligence and
information for the aerial battles. Accurate predictions and forecasting
provided the allied forces the edge they needed against the German and
Japanese forces. The invasion of Normandy also benefitted from American
meteorologists, although the issue is contentious. Irving Krick and Colonel
Benjamin Holzman led the American based meteorological team titled
“Widewing.” Through their insistence, the allied forces decided to land on the
sixth of June, despite bleak forecasts from the other allied meteorological
teams.116 When word reached the United States that American meteorologists
were supposedly able to locate a break in the storm that the European’s could
not, Krick capitalized on the notoriety to increase his own social standing.
The story is incomplete however, as Widewing was not entirely responsible
for the forecast. Sverre Petterssen, who worked with the British
meteorological team, pointed out years later that Widewing adamantly
suggested storming the beach on the fifth, which would have resulted in a
complete and utter failure.117 Only through his team’s insistence was the
offensive delayed, highlighting the importance of collaboration and utilizing
multiple methods of weather analysis (despite Petterssen’s disapproval).
World War II also allowed the bureau the opportunity to engage in a
period of rapid modernization that utilized such technologies as radar,
improved aircraft, and an expanding network of radiosonde activities.
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Military applications of meteorological services continued their interaction in
the post war period as the Cold War initiated an era of fear over
meteorological warfare.

Post World War II: Operational Numerical Weather Prediction,
Satellites
Historians generally view the post-World War II time period as an
unheralded occasion of advancement for American meteorology. The new
technologies available for meteorological study immeasurably improved the
bureau’s practices and techniques. Although there is no denying the assertion
of a period of great improvement and modernization, it has its roots in the
meteorological past. Popkin wrote in 1967 about how the budget for the
bureau after the war steadily increased with only slight reductions in the
Eisenhower administration. Despite this increased funding, Popkin wrote, the
service of the bureau to the American public hardly changed at all.118
In late December of 1945 John Mauchly, a pioneer in computer
development, visited Major Harry Wexler at the Air Weather Service in the
Pentagon to ask his opinion about the possible uses of computational devices
within meteorology. Since the bureau had previously informed Mauchly that
interest lay solely in automated data handling and statistical computation, it
was a welcome surprise when the future head of research enthusiastically
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supported a more significant role.119 Mauchly recalled, “[Wexler] suggested
immediately that such a machine be employed in integrating hydrodynamic
equations occurring in meteorological work. He attaches a great deal of
importance to this application.”120 From that moment on, Wexler and the
weather bureau were inextricably involved in digital computing.
In 1946 Wexler moved back to the weather bureau where he and his
supervisor, Reichelderfer, sponsored a number of meetings with computer
specialists. That year, Wexler began working as a liaison to the Institute of
Advanced Study Meteorology Project in Princeton, helping to secure funding
and offering advice and aid to its director, John von Neumann. Von
Neumann, the esteemed mathematician, set himself to work in Princeton
developing equations for computational devices to be utilized for
meteorological benefit. The weather bureau's influence was paramount to the
project's eventual operational success in 1954. Although there were many
logistical and academic problems, Reichelderfer and Wexler refused to
abandon the project; instead they facilitated an interdisciplinary,
international project that utilized the support of the military and teamed up
with such influential meteorologists as Rossby and Jule Charney.
By 1954, the weather bureau advanced the program initiated by Abbe
(1901) and Bjerknes (1904) of weather prediction as a problem in mechanics
and physics. Utilizing newly available electronic computers, Wexler and
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company helped bridge the gap between the graphical and digital methods.
Operational Numerical Weather Prediction came to fruition after years of
challenging work by many individuals such as John von Neumann, Phillip
Thompson, Jule Charney, and Harry Wexler among others. Wexler acted as
liaison to the Institute and dealt with the issues that arose in regards to
personnel, logistics, and of course meteorological information.
Wexler also played a critical role in satellite meteorology, through his
advocacy of new technologies such as rockets and radar in order to study the
outer realm of the Earth’s atmosphere. German V2 rockets provided the
technological capacity to reach the edge of space and were utilized to collect
meteorological data. Explorer 6 captured the first photograph from space in
1959 and in 1960 Tiros 1 (Television Infra-Red Observation Satellite) became
the world’s first weather satellite.121 Working in collaboration with NASA, the
weather bureau became a leader in space meteorology due to satellite
technology. Wexler, like Humphreys and Abbe before him, is a prime example
of the continuous efforts at modernization and scientific improvement found
in many of the employees of the United States Weather Bureau.

Conclusion
The United States Weather Bureau arose as a practical service for
business and agriculture, to serve specific purposes for the American people.
These demands included specific warnings for agriculture and commerce as
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well as individual requests made of the bureau.122 Over the decades, the
bureau took on new responsibilities such as forest fire precautions and upper
air reports for the aviation industry. After 1908, individuals who purchased
Ford Model T vehicles often called into their local weather bureau office
looking for predictions about their drive. Insurance agencies that began
issuing policies against weather phenomena, and organizers of sporting
events also inquired about weather information. The constant needs of the
American citizenry are encapsulated in a New York Times article from March
12, 1929: “Not infrequently, it was said, 1,500 ‘busy line’ reports have been
recorded in a single day at the bureau switchboard and the average number of
busy lines is about 1,000 daily. About 2,000 calls receive attention each
working day.”123 These obligations limited the amount of resources that could
be dedicated to emerging techniques such as air mass analysis. The delay,
however, was only of a few years and for specific, justified reasons.
Vilhelm Bjerknes founded the Bergen School in 1917, with general
acceptance of their air mass analysis techniques and international diffusion
coming by 1928. The geographical features of North America differ greatly
from Europe, so adoption of air mass techniques was not straightforward and
weather forecasting necessitated a significant amount of further study. The
weather bureau carried out this work throughout the late 1920s and 30s
through the collaboration of established and emerging meteorologists
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dedicated to improving the accuracy of forecasting and understanding the
physical makeup and dynamics of the atmosphere.
The weather bureau has been marred in public perception because of
disgruntled individuals and personal vendettas that have maligned the agency
for malpractice and misuse of funds. This disparaging view of the agency has
persisted through time, perpetuated by historians eager to put forward the
notion of American meteorology solely as a post WWII venture. Mainstream
media outlets that blasted the agency for any missed forecast ignored the fact
that the bureau under Harrington (1891-1895) averaged between 80-85%
correct forecasting.124 It is only through a careful study of the time and agents
involved that the bureau’s goals and actual practices become clear and
separate from the false accusations. The United States Weather Bureau is one
of the most misrepresented government agencies in history, with an
inordinate amount of duties compared to their meager budget and subject to
criticism from all sides.
The agency steadily improved their techniques and habits through
increased study and practice. The Norwegian methods of Bjerknes and his
colleagues were slightly delayed in their incorporation, however this setback
should not overshadow the bureau’s historical dedication to advancing
meteorology and the service to the American people. With the incorporation
of meteorological equipment on the Tiros satellites of the 1960s, the United
States Weather Bureau firmly established itself, as a premiere meteorological
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agency, advanced in both practical and theoretical meteorology through its
continuous efforts in modernization. Current historiographical accounts of
the national weather service are filled with misrepresentations and
incomplete depictions due to the breadth of contributing factors and sources.
The agency experienced scandals and shortcomings, but also made great
strides in developing meteorological techniques and providing weather
services to the growing nation.
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